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~ IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL R. MELLEN, 
i 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ! 
I vs. 1 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, UTAH RICHARDSON \'. 
ROOFING and THE STATE . 
INSURANCE FUND, ; 
I 
! Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10795 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Utah for disability by reason of a heart 
condition claimed to have been aggravated while per-
forming the work of a self-employed roofer. 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COlVIMISSION 
The matter was heard by the Industrial Commis-
sion and referred to a lVIedical Panel. The Medical 
1 
Panel filed its report with the Industrial Commission, 
finding that the applicant did not sustain an injury 
as alleged which could be considered as an industrial 
accident. The Industrial Commission adopted the re-
port and denied plaintiff's claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the Indus-
trial Commission and the granting of his claim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Com-
mission on September 22, 1965, for a disability incurred 
while performing roofing work on June 23, 1965. 
(R. 3). 
Plaintiff testified that he has been a roofing con· 
tractor in the Salt Lake City area since 1947. He testi-
fied that he is the sole owner and proprietor of Utah 
Richardson Roofing. Plaintiff, at the time of the inci-
dent of June 23, 1965, was 55 years of age. (R. 15). 
He testified that prior to June 23, 1965, he had never 
seen a doctor for any type of a heart condition, and 
that there were no prior heart complaints. (R. 27-29). 
He testified that on June 23, 1965, he was finishing 
up a roofing job on the roof of the Aix La Chappelle 
Apartments in the area of 2240 East 4800 South. 
(R. 16). He stated that he started on the job at approxi-
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mately 7 :00 A.M. in the morning and was working at 
1 a faster rate than usual in an attempt to finish so that 
he could collect his pay. ( R. 24) . He testified that the 
work was extremely arduous and that he felt that he 
oyerdid it physically that morning. Also, he testified that 
during the entire week he ·was in a state of nervous ten-
1 sion hoping to finish the job as soon as possible. (R. 24, 
25) . Plaintiff described the details of the work as requir-
ing him to make trips up and down a ladder carrying 
buckets of roofing cement and the details of finishing up 
the work around chimneys, which entailed chiseling out 
mortar and nailing cement nails with a 6-pound hammer, 
and part of the time having to get on his knees in 
order to hammer the nails; that this was extremely 
arduous labor. He stated that between 10 :00 and 
11 :00 A.M. he was working on a chimney and was 
driving cement nails with the hammer, when he experi-
enced "extreme pain" in his high upper chest. He de-
scribed the pain as severe and testified that he experi-
enced unusual perspiration; that this caused him to 
have to quit his work and sit down in the shade of the 
chimney for ten to fifteen minutes. (R. 18). After sit-
ting down for ten to fifteen minutes, he resumed his work 
until noon when he had lunch. ( R. 19) . He finished 
work at approximately 3:00 P.M., and while driving 
back to his shop experienced another pain in the same 
area of his chest. ( R. 20) . After arriving home he 
cleaned up and sat in an easy chair until dinnertime; 
and when he sat down to the table for dinner, he was 
struck hard with pain; and his speech was incoherent, 
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due to a tightness in his throat. His wife called Dr. 
Trowbridge. She then took him to the St. Mark's Hos-
pital at the suggestion of Dr. Trowbridge. Plaintiff 
also experienced a numb and stinging pain in his arms 
and passed out after arriving at the hospital. (R. 22). 
Dr. Behrens treated plaintiff at the hospital during 
his stay of approximately three weeks. Dr. Behrens 
testified that plaintiff had suffered an occlusion of the 
anterior coronary vessel which resulted in destruction 
of muscle on the anterior surface of the heart, which 
was replaced by scar tissue. ( R. 88) . 
The Panel agrees with the diagnosis of arterio-
sclerotic heart disease, with coronary thrombosis, with 
anterior myocardial infarction of the anterior wall of 
the heart. ( R. 46) . 
]\fr. Mellen testified concernmg complaints of 
chest pains during the few days prior to the incident 
of June 23, 1965, and stated (R. 26) that during the 
first part of the week he had experienced slight pains, 
which he felt to be gas pains and that they had not 
been severe enough to cause him to stop working. He 
stated that he experienced these pains while working 
on the same roofing job. (R. 26, 27). On further ques-
tioning in a later hearing, plaintiff testified in more 
detail concerning the pains prior to June 23. He testi-
fied that the first pain he had was while performing 
heavy work on the same job on approximately June 
19, at which time he also experienced perspiration anrl 
stopped for a short time, and that the very first time 
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that he felt pain was while he was working on this same 
roofing job. (R. 75, 76). Dr. Behrens testified as to 
the history which Mr. Mellen gave him at the hospital 
as follows, (R. 89): 
"At that time he stated that over a period of 
two to three days prior to the 23d he had noted 
some anterior chest pain of a squeezing nature, 
which seemed to radiate into his arms. This would 
occur with exertion, and when he would stop 
and rest it would stop. It was particularly 
severe he said on the day before he came in-or 
the day of admission, during the daytime-since 
he was admitted in the evening. When he was 
finishing up the job and was pounding cement 
nails, he found that this amount of exertion 
caused his chest pain to come on rather rapidly 
and quite severely, and he would have to stop 
pounding for a period of time. It would subside, 
and then recur again when he would attempt to 
pound them." 
The Panel report in relating the history at R. 47 
states in part as follows: 
"Furthermore the historical information is 
plainly indicative that he had chest pain typical 
of coronary arterial sclerosis from about 6-19-
65, which would be five days preceding the day 
of his alleged injury on 6-23-65. He relates an 
attack of very severe chest pain during the night 
of 6-21-65 when after supper approximately nine 
p.m., his angina! pain was so severe that he took 
medication containing codein for the relief of 
pain. This would tend to indicate that he had 
symptoms directly related to his heart disease 
before the date of the alleged injury." 
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It should be noted that there is no substantiation 
in the record for the above statement as to a severe at-
tack on June 21, 1965. Plaintiff testified under oath on 
two occasions, and the only incident at home which he 
mentioned was the one on June 23, 1965, immediately 
prior to being taken to the hospital. In any event, plain-
tiff testified that the prior pains which were not as 
severe as the one on June 23, were also pains that he 
experienced while working on the same roofing job. 
After testifying that l\!Ir. l\'Iellen is disabled from 
going on with the roofing business ( R. 88), and after 
being asked to assume hypothetical facts concerning 
the events of June 23, 1965, and for some few days 
prior thereto, and the history that was furnished by Mr. 
Mellen, Dr. Behrens was asked if he had an opinion 
as to whether or not the activities on the job that Mr. 
Mellen described precipitated the condition that he 
found him to be suffering from. 
Dr. Behrens stated (R. 93): 
"I do feel that the exertion which he carried 
on during that day hastened the onset of the 
ultimate situation." 
And in further explanation, the following questions 
and answers occurred ( R. 93) : 
MR. BLACK: "Q And what was the pre-
existing underlying condition that he had? 
A This would have to be-I can't state this defi-
definitely in terms of pathology or anatomy, 
but it would have to be narrowing of the coro-
6 
nary arteries, or this particular coronary ar-
tery in particular. 
Q And this is a condition, as I understand it, 
that develops gradually over a long period 
of time usually? 
A As far as we know, it does, yes. 
Q But as I understand your answer, a person 
can be gping along with the underlying con-
dition, and not be disabled until an event 
happens where the condition of the myocar-
dial infarction is preci pi ta ted? 
A That's correct. 
Q And is that your opinion of what happened 
in this particular case? 
A Yes." 
On further questioning on cross examination, the 
following answers occurred: (R. 98). 
" (Mr. Moore) Now you have testified, in re-
gards to Mr. Black's hypothetical, that the 
activities of the job is what hastened the on-
set? 
A Yes. 
Q What particular activities? 
A I think the heavy physical exertion. 
Q All right. How about worry? Could that have 
hastened it? 
A I think it very possibly could. 
Q How about the stress of the necessity of get-
ting the job done? 
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A Very possibly. However, the pain came on in 
relation to the exertion. Physical exertion. 
Q 'V ell, how do you know? If he was worrying 
about it, how do you know that the pain came 
on because of the physical exertion, or the 
worry? 
A vV ell, because when he stopped working the 
pain disappeared again." 
The panel report stated in part as follows: (R. 47) 
"The panel members have agreed that the 
situation of overwork, anxiety related to finan-
cial reverses, etc. should not be a factor in con-
sidering an industrial accident. As was stated 
by the patient he was working under stress at-
tempting to finish the job he was doing in order 
that payment could be received. The actual work 
he was doing was no different than he had been 
accustomed to for a number of years. Hence the 
situation as it was, with his pain in the chest 
occurring long before the day of the alleged 
injury, would tend to indicate that he had a 
natural evolution of a degenerative process in his 
heart, which culminated in an attack of pain and 
apparent collapse on or about seven p.m. while 
at home on the night of 6-23-65. 
"'Vith this evidence before us, and all factors 
being considered, the panel members cannot 
assume and cannot decide that the applicant sus-
tained an injury, as alleged, which could be con-
sidered as an industrial accident on 6-23-65. It 
is agreed that the applicant's present disability 
due to heart disease cannot be considered to be 
of industrial origin." 
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On examination of Dr. Elmer Kilpatrick, the 
Chairman of the Panel, the following occurred in part: 
(R. 65). 
"A Do I understand your question clearly, in 
that you want me to answer whether his work 
produced the pain? 
Q ~Thether the work activities that he described 
to you had any connection at all with the pain, 
or the symptoms that he described? 
A Oh, sure they did. 
Q What was that? 
A Well, as I have stated before here, he would 
work, develop pain, rest, the pain would sub-
side, he'd continue working, and so on through 
the afternoon." 
And the following, (R. 66): 
"A Well, that is true. But the pain itself does 
not necessarily mean that an actual heart at-
tack has happened. The pain factor just 
means that it's a warning to him that he is 
exceeding his heart capability, until he gets 
an actual infarction, or the narrowing of the 
blood vessels becomes so great that he can 
have progression of his natural evolution of 
disease without actually having a heart at-
tack. 
Q 'Vell, what can happen then if he disregards 
the warning, the pain that he gets, and con-
tinues on working? 
A Well, either the pain gets so bad that he can't 
go, or he develops a state of overpowering 
weakness and collapses. 
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Q And can he, in a situation like that, develop 
a myocardial infarction? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q 'Vouldn't you agree that this is the type of 
thing that could have happened in this situ-
tion here, with Mr. Mellen? 
A It could have." 
Plaintiff's claim was denied by order of the Indus-
trial Commission dated November 14, 1966. Plaintiff 
filed a petition for rehearing which was denied on No-
vember 25, 1966. Plaintiff thereafter filed his petition 
for writ of certiorari to appeal the order of the Indus-
trial Commission denying his claim. 
POINT I 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
'VAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE. 
The denial of plaintiff's claim by the Medical Panel 
is based on incorrect interpretations of law by the Panel 
and is contrary to the undisputed evidence. 
In the first place, the Panel states that the situation 
of overwork, anxiety related to financial conditions, 
financial reverses, etc., should not be a factor in con-
sidering an industrial accident. The fallacy of this is 
obvious. Certainly, evidence such as this in addition to 
a situation where an applicant is engaged in strenuous 
physical labor cannot be overlooked as part of the fad 
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situation. Also, we refer to the cases too numerous to 
mention where overwork has precipitated the disability 
or death resulting in an award. 
The Panel goes on to mistakenly assume that an 
applicant must show unusual exertion as a cause of the 
mJury. The Panel states: 
"The actual work he was doing was no differ-
ent than he had been accustomed to for a number 
of years. Hence the situation as it was with his 
pain in the chest occurring long before the day 
of the alleged injury, would tend to indicate that 
he had a natural evolution of a degenerative 
process in his heart, which culminated in an 
attack of pain and apparent collapse on or about 
seven p.m. while at home on the night of 6-23-
65." 
The above statements show that the Panel has 
ignored the undisputed evidence in this case, that a pe-
riod of only a few days was involved from the onset of 
the pains which were slight in the beginning to the 
severe pains on June 23, 1965, while pounding cement 
nails. The foregoing statement also ignores the fact 
that the prior occasions when pain was experienced 
were connected with the same work that applicant was 
doing at the time of the incident on June 23, 1965. 
The evidence was undisputed that Daniel Mellen 
had never experienced chest pains prior to the few 
days before June 23, 1965. The evidence is undisputed 
that the pains which he did experience to a lesser degree 
the few days before June 23, 1965, and the more pro-
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nounced and severe pain on June 23, were all experi-
enced in connection with the work that he was doing 
on the roofing job. On top of this, Dr. Behrens testified 
unqualifiedly that in his opinion the exertions of the 
job precipitated the underlying condition to a sympto-
matic point resulting in his present disability. This 
undisputed testimony brings the case within the lan-
guage of Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
" * * * on account of any accident or injury 
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated, or incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of his em-
ployment." (Italics ours). 
Opposed to this undisputed evidence, the Panel 
report contains misconceptions of law and misstate-
ments of fact. The report totally ignores the undisputed 
testimony that the pain started with the exertions of 
the work. The denial by the Panel appears to be based 
on the unusual exertion rule which was abolished by 
the case of Purity Biscuit Company, et al., v. The In-
dustrial Commisson, et al., ( 1949) 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961. Since the holding in the Purity Biscuit Com-
pany case, the law in Utah has been concerned with the 
simple proposition as to whether or not the exertion, 
whether it be unusual or usual, caused the injury in 
question. The Industrial Commission in adopting the 
Panel report has ignored this case and the later Utah 
cases which followed it. The Court stated in the Purity 
Biscuit Company case, at page 19: 
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"There is nothing in the statute which requires 
or authorizes us to deny compensation merely 
because the same type of accident might have 
happened at a time or place where the employee 
was not acting in the course of his employment. 
Nor is there any other reason or justification for 
us so holding." 
This Court in the Purity Biscuit Company case 
held that an award was justified where the evidence 
showed that the precipitating act was merely the act 
of pushing down on the clutch and letting it out in 
driving a truck. The activities in the case at bar con-
sisted of exertion on a roofing job which caused the 
chest pain and other symptoms which resulted in the 
heart attack and resulting disability. Opposed to the 
direct testimony of Dr. Behrens is the speculation in-
dulged in by the Medical Panel that the heart attack 
was merely the natural evolution of a degenerative 
process in the heart. The Panel has totally ignored the 
command of the statute that allows recovery where the 
exertion of the job precipitates or hastens the onset 
of the underlying condition from nondisabling to dis-
abling. 
The case of Jones, et al., v. California Packing 
Corporation (1952) 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, is 
clear authority for reversing denial of an award when 
contrary to the undisputed evidence. That case involved 
death from coronary occlusion occurring after exertion 
on the job by the husband of claimant. After stating 
the well-settled principle which has been ignored by the 
Industrial Commission in the case at bar that: 
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"It is settled beyond question that a pre-exist-
ing disease or other disturbed condition or defect 
of the body when aggravated or lighted up by 
an industrial accident is compensable under the 
act, * * * (page 615). 
the Court proceeded b· examine the medical evidence 
in the record. The plaintiffs called two doctors who 
each testified positively that it was their opinion that 
this occlusion and death resulted from the exertion and 
fatigue caused by the work under the circumstances 
described just prior to Jones' death. The opposing 
evidence was given by a doctor who was given the hypo-
thetical question and answered as follows: 
"I can't answer the question yes or no because 
I don't think the medical literature from my own 
opinion or anybody else's opinion can say dog-
matically this is a definite cause, because the 
medical literature is full of statements that there 
is some relationship between effort and coronary 
thrombosis; and the literature is full of state-
ments to the effect that apparently effort has no 
relationship to coronary thrombosis. * * * My 
own opinion is that it possibly is related in this 
particular case, but I don't think you can dog-
matically say that it is a cause and effect or it 
has no effect." 
The evidence was positive on one side and incon-
clusive on the other, with the result that the Industrial 
Commission was bound, so the Court held, to accept 
the evidence of the plaintiff. 
Likewise, in the case at bar, the evidence produced 
on behalf of the plaintiff is clear, direct, positive, and 
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unequivocal, while the conclusions of the Panel are 
based on misconceptions of law and facts and filled with 
speculation and conjecture. The Panel report states 
that Daniel Mellen had a severe attack at home prior 
1 to the 23rd day of June, when there is no such fact in 
the record. The undisputed evidence in the record shows 
that the first time Mellen had any chest pains was in 
connection with his work on the roof, and that the pains 
came with exertion and left with rest. The only testi-
mony in the record as to an attack at home is the one 
testified to by Mellen which occurred after the attack 
on the job on June 23, 1965. Dr. Kilpatrick admits 
in his testimony that the work activities caused the pain, 
and yet he would speculate that the heart attack hap-
pened completely as a natural progression of the under-
lying condition, without the job activities having any 
effect at all in aggravating the underlying condition. 
The Panel has further disregarded the basic and 
fundamental principle stated recently by this Court 
in the case of Baker v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
et al., (1965) 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, which re-
affirms the liberal philosophy of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Statutes as follows at page 143: 
"In accordance with the purpose of the In-
dustral Compensation Act to alleviate hardships 
upon workers and their families, the facts and 
inferences therefrom constituting a worker's 
right to recover are liberally construed." 
The Baker case is also clear authority for reversing 
the Industrial Commission in the case at bar. In that 
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case the court held that the undisputed evidence could 
not be ignored by the Industrial Commission where the 
evidence showed that claimant suffered a sudden sharp 
pain in her left hip and leg as she stooped over or 
raised up in filing papers in a filing cabinet. 
The evidence in the case at bar is more compelling 
than was the evidence in the Baker and Purity Biscuit 
Company cases, where slight physical movement pre-
cipitated underlying nondisabling conditions to the 
point of disability. The evidence in the case at bar is 
undisputed that )'Hellen had no disability prior to the 
incidents of June 23 and shortly prior thereto, and that 
following these incidents he has received a substantial 
disability. 
As it has been said, a person starts dying from the 
day he is born. Almost any disability a person has in 
later life has resulted from an underlying condition 
which gradually progresses to the point of disability. 
The vVorkmen's Compensation Statutes allow recovery 
for a person whose disability has been hastened by the 
incidents of his employment. Certainly the undisputed 
evidence in the case at bar places this case in such a 
category. Who can say that the incidents of Mellen's 
work did not precipitate and hasten this heart condition 
from which he now suffers? The Medical Panel made 
no such statement but speculated that his heart condi-
tion inevitably resulted from an underlying and pro-
gressing condition. 
This case is no different from the Baker and Purit.11 
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Biscuit C01npany cases and others, where underlying 
conditions have been aggravated and precipitated to 
the point of disability or death. 
In the spirit of liberality underlying the Work-
men's Compensation Statutes, the denial of plaintiff's 
claim by the Industrial Commission should be reversed 
and his claim granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Appellant 
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